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Abstract Being aware of mutual influences between indi-
viduals is a major requirement a robot to efficiently operate
in human populated environments. This is especially true
for the navigation among humans with its mutual avoid-
ance maneuvers. While humans easily manage this task,
robotic systems are still facing problems. Most of the recent
approaches concentrate on predicting the motions of humans
individually and deciding afterwards. Thereby, interactivity
is mostly neglected. In this work, we go one step back and
focus on understanding the underlying principle of human
decision making in the presence of multiple humans. Non-
cooperative game theory is applied to formulate the problem
of predicting the decisions of multiple humans that interact
which each other during navigation. Therefore, we use the
theory of Nash equilibria in static and dynamic games where
different cost functions from literature rate the payoffs of the
individual humans. The approach anticipates collisions and
additionally reasons about several avoidance maneuvers of
all humans. For the evaluation of the game theoretic approach
we recorded trajectories of humans passing each other. The
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decision process of humans more accurately than a decision
model that predicts humans individually.
Keywords Game theory · Interaction-aware decision
making · Human motion analysis · Interactivity during
navigation
1 Introduction
Robots have evolved immensely in the past decades, but there
is still a long way to go in terms of enabling them to per-
manently operate in human populated environments. First
achievements include robots that navigate autonomously to
unknown places [7,53] or guide people at fairs [62]. Apart
from that, autonomous vehicles already navigate in urban
environments among human-driven vehicles [81]. Other
robots interact physically with humans, for example they
hand over objects [72] or assist elderly people [63]. These
applications show that the barrier between robots and humans
has been fading, which leads to a major challenge in robot-
ics: ensuring reliable and socially accepted motion in order
to realize the human-robot coexistence. A vital factor for
achieving this goal is the awareness of the mutual influ-
ence between human individuals and the robotic systems.
Modern robotic systems have to consider that humans are
interaction-aware: they reason about the impact of possi-
ble future actions on the surrounding and expect similar
anticipation from everyone else [6,55,61]. Of our particu-
lar interest is the interaction-aware navigation of humans,
meaning the conditionally cooperative behavior that leads
to mutual avoidance maneuvers. Common motion planners
neglect this notion and focus on independent motion predic-
tion of individuals. Thereby, the prediction can be unreliable
because it is indifferent to humans that might avoid the robot.
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It is important, that the future trajectory of the humandepends
on the motion of the surrounding humans and on the motion
of the robot. Consequences are unnecessary detours, inef-
ficient stop and go motions, or a complete standstill if the
planner fails to identify a collision-free trajectory. The worst
case is a collision with a human. Trautman et al. [78] argue
that these problems would still exist with perfect predic-
tion and that they could only be resolved by anticipating
the human mutual collision avoidance. This clarifies that the
individual motion prediction of humans and a consecutive
planning of the robot motion is a poor model for human deci-
sion making. Hence, a main reason of robotic problems lies
in an insufficient model of the human decision process. That
is why we model human decision making in the presence of
multiple humans during navigation. We formulate a decision
model that considers interaction-awareness and reasoning.
On top, the model can cope with human diversity: humans
decide individually (decentralized planning) and have differ-
ent preferences (e.g., speed, goal).
In this paper, the problem formulation of interaction-
aware decisionmaking is based on game theory.Game theory
is “the study of mathematical models of conflict and coop-
eration between intelligent rational decision-makers” [51,
p. 1]. It extends the traditional optimal control theory to a
decentralized multi-agent decision problem [3, p. 3]. Thus,
prediction and planning are considered simultaneously. We
specifically choose to use game theory because it is a
mathematical formulation and incorporates reasoning about
possible actions of others and consequences of interde-
pendencies, i.e. interaction-awareness. It further allows for
individual decision making and individual utility functions
that capture preferences. Its strength lies within its generaliz-
ability. Accordingly, a variety ofmodeling approaches exists,
as well as diverse solution concepts that aim to predict the
decision of agents, for example which trajectory they will
take. Within this work, our focus lies on the solution con-
cept of Nash equilibria in non-cooperative games. These are
equilibria where no one gains anything by only changing the
own decision.
General Idea: Approximating the decision making of
humans during interaction-aware navigation with the the-
ory of Nash equilibria in non-cooperative games.
In the following, two possible ways to model human
navigation are presented. One model assumes simultaneous
decision making, the other one sequential decision making.
Both models are combined with cost functions from liter-
ature. We evaluate for which of these combinations, Nash’s
theory reproduces the navigational decisions of humans best.
Thereby, the evaluation is based on captured human motion
data to ensure real human behavior. Additionally, the game
theoretic approach is compared with a common prediction
based decision model. Our intention is to draw further con-
clusions about human navigational behavior and to highlight
Fig. 1 Deciding human-like during navigation; interactivity, like
mutual avoidance maneuvers, needs to be considered
the potential of game theory for this problem. Note, that
the presented work focuses on humans and on modeling
their decisions. We do not yet present a motion predic-
tion or motion planning algorithm for robots. However, the
derived knowledge can improvemotion prediction of humans
and robot motion planning, as well as the social accep-
tance of robots. If the behavior of a robot is based on a
human-like decision process, its intentions are far easier to
interpret and as a result, a human interaction partner feels
more secure [12,77] (Fig. 1).
This paper is organized as follows. Sect. 2 surveys the
work related to humanmotion analysis and interaction-aware
navigation. The next section gives an outline of the game the-
oretic method used to analyze human motion (Sect. 3); two
different models and five possible cost functions are pre-
sented. The experimental setup and the evaluation method
are discussed in Sect. 4, followed by the results in Sect. 5,
and possible extensions in Sect. 6.
2 Related Work
The problem of modeling interaction-awareness of several
agents has been addressed in different areas including human
motion analysis, computer animation and robot motion plan-
ning. It is particularly attractive for a branch within the latter
field—the socially-aware robot navigation [39,66]. Related
experiments and motion planners that consider interactivity
are presented in this section. Additionally, the section elab-
orates about applications of game theory in motion planning
and decision making problems.
Various groups of researches have studied human col-
lision avoidance during walking [5,6,15,16,31,54,55,61].
They have been interested inwhen,where, aswell as towhich
extent humans adjust their path or velocity to avoid a collision
with another dynamic object. All studies agree that humans
anticipate the future motion of dynamic objects and possible
collisions. That means that humans include prediction into
their own motion planning and do not solely react. How-
ever, parts of these studies neglect the interaction-awareness
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of humans during walking by only considering avoidance
maneuvers with a passive, dynamic object. For example, the
subjects of the studies by Cinelli and Patla [15,16] had to
avoid a human-shaped doll that was moving towards them;
Basili et al. [5] and Huber et al. [31] asked their participants
to cross paths with a non-reacting human.
In contrast are the studies from Pettré et al. [61], van
Basten et al. [6], and Olivier et al. [54,55]. These authors
told two participants to avoid a collision, which revealed
that humans collaboratively adjust their gait. Interestingly,
the amount of adjustment was unequally distributed [55,61]:
the person passing first had less effort because s/he mainly
adopted the velocity, whereas the one giving way adjusted
both, velocity and path. In summary, analyzing human loco-
motor trajectories shows up the important characteristics of
human collision avoidance. This can be used to evaluate
or enhance the human-likeness of motion models. Unfortu-
nately, it does not reveal how to reproduce human avoidance
behavior in order to use it for motion prediction or motion
planning.
Researchers have often based human motion models on
repulsive forces acting on particles. That has been especially
popular for crowd simulations: Pelechano et al. [59] or Sud
et al. [76] employ the social forces model [28] where the
agents are exposed to different repulsive and attractive forces
depending on their relative distances; Heïgeas et al. [27]
define forces in analogy to a spring-damper systemwith vary-
ing stiffness and viscosity values; and Treuille et al. [79] use a
potential field approach. However, we refrain from elaborat-
ing this field deeper becausemostworks are based on reactive
approaches and neglect that humans include prediction in
theirmotion planning.While thismay be appropriate for high
density crowds, reactive approaches struggle—according
to [5,31,61]—with creating locally realistic motions in low
or medium density crowds.
Trautman et al. [78] focus on thesemediumdensity crowds
and plan further ahead by relying on Gaussian processes.
The authors define the “Freezing Robot Problem”: once the
environment gets to crowded, the planner rates all possible
maneuvers as unsafe due to increasing prediction uncertainty.
As a result, the robot “freezes” or performs unnecessary
detours. They argue that this problem would still exist,
even without uncertainty and with perfect prediction. It
could be resolved by anticipating the human collaborative
collision avoidance. They developed a non-parametric sta-
tistical model based on Gaussian processes that estimates
crowd interaction from data. Thereby, independent Gaussian
processes are coupled by a repulsive force between the
agents. Experiments verified that the interactive algorithm
outperforms a merely reactive one.
An earlier approach was shown by Reynolds [65]. He
uses different steering behaviors to simulate navigating
agents. One of these behaviors—the unaligned collision
avoidance—predicts future collisions based on a constant
velocity assumption and gets the agents to adjust steering
and velocity to avoid state-time space leading to a collision.
In contrast to this rule based method are approaches
based on velocity obstacles [22], like its probabilistic exten-
sions [37]. Van den Berg et al. [9] combine a precomputed
roadmap with so-called reciprocal velocity obstacles. This
approach is updated in [10] to the optimal reciprocal colli-
sion avoidance that guarantees collision-free navigation for
multiple robots assuming a holonomicmotionmodel. Further
assumptions are that each robot possesses perfect knowledge
about the shape, position and velocity of other robots and
objects in the environment. Extensions that incorporate kine-
matic and dynamic constraints exist in [1,74].
However, Pettré et al. [61] state that the works in [65]
and [9] lack to simulate the large variety of the human
behavior because they rely on near-constant anticipation-
times and on the common knowledge that all agents apply the
same avoidance strategy. Instead, they presented an approach
which produces more human-like trajectories: they solve
pairwise interactions with a geometrical model based on the
relative positions and velocities of the agents. It is tuned
with experimental data and analyzed according its validity
for crowds by Ondrˇej et al. [56]. The authors state to per-
form better, in a sense that the travel duration of the agents
is shorter, when compared to [9] or [28].
Shiomi et al. [71] developed a robot that successfully
navigates within a shopping mall. It relies on an extended
social force model that includes the time to collision as
a parameter to compute an elliptic repulsion field around
an agent [85]. Mutual collision avoidance is implicitly
introduced by calibrating the repulsion force with human
avoidance trajectories. A field trial revealed that the robot
using this method was perceived as safer than if it used a time
varying dynamic window approach [70]. Nevertheless, most
of the mentioned methods assume that an agent’s behavior
can be described by a limited set of rules.
Recently, learningbasedapproaches are becoming increa-
singly popular. Lerner et al. [43] extract trajectories from
video data to simulate human crowds. They create a database
containing example navigation behaviors that are described
by the spatio-temporal relationship between nearby persons
and objects. During the simulation the current state of the
environment is compared with the entries of the database.
The most similar entry defines the trajectory of the agent,
thus, implicitly creates reactive behavior. This means that
the variety of the behaviors is limited to the size of the
database. Moreover, all individuals need to be controlled
globally.
Luber et al. [46] proposed an unsupervised learning
approach based on clustering observed, pairwise navigation
behaviors into different motion prototypes. These proto-
types are defined by the relative distance of two agents over
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time and their approaching angle. They are used to derive a
dynamic cost map for a Theta∗ planner that generates a path
at each time step.
Apart from that, many researchers rely on inverse rein-
forcement learning techniques. Kuderer et al. [40] learn a
certain navigation policy while a robot is tele-operated. The
principle of maximum entropy [88] is used to learn the
weights of the feature functions. In particular, homotopy
classes (i.e., on which side to pass an object) are consid-
ered. Kretzschmar et al. [38] improve this method further;
they used a joint mixture distribution that consists on one
hand of a discrete distribution over these homotopy classes,
and on the other hand of continuous distributions over the
trajectories in each homotopy class. An experiment revealed
that the resulting trajectories are perceived as more human-
like than the one produced by their previous method [40] or
the social force model [28].
An alternative is given by Henry et al. [29] who learn
how a simulated agent has to join a pedestrian flow by
using the density and average flow directions as features.
Similarly, Kim and Pineau [36] proposed to use the popu-
lation density and velocity of the surrounding objects. The
effect of the different features in [29] and [36] were investi-
gate by Vasquez et al. [82] and compared with social force
features [28]. Results showed that the social force features
perform best when applied specifically for the learned scene,
but seem to generalize worst to other scenes. The features in
[29] and [36] are more generalizable and manage similarly
well.
A new approach to consider interaction-awareness is to
model the navigational decision problem with game theory.
By providing the language to formulate decision problems,
game theory has already found some ways into robotics. It
is used in robust control [4,23,58], for example for landing
an aircraft [23]. Also the task planning of a planetary surface
rover runs with game theoretic tools [32].
The use of game theory is also growing within the robotic
research community, in particular in thefields ofmotion plan-
ning and coordination. LaValle and Hutchinson [42] were
among the first who proposed game theory for the high-level
planning of multiple robot coordination. Specific applica-
tions are a multi-robot search for several targets [48], the
shared exploration of structured workspaces like building
floors [73], or coalition formation [24]. Closely related to
these coordination tasks is the family of pursuit-evasion prob-
lems. For example in [3,49,83], and can be formulated as a
zero-sum or differential game. Zhang et al. [86] introduced
a control policy for a motion planner that enables a robot
to avoid static obstacles and to coordinate its motion with
other robots. Their policy is based on zero-sum games and
assigning priorities to the different robots. Thus, it eludes
possiblemutual avoidancemaneuvers by treating robots with
a higher priority as static obstacles. The motion of mul-
tiple robots with the same priority are coordinated within
the work of Roozbehani et al. [67]. They focused on cross-
ings and developed cooperative strategies to resolve conflicts
among autonomous vehicles. Recently, Zhu et al. [87] dis-
cussed a game theoretic controller synthesis for multi-robot
motion planning. So far, there has been almost no attempts
to connect game theory with models for human motion—
with the exception of Hoogendoorn and Bovy [30]. They
focus on simulating crowdmovements andgenerated promis-
ing results, especially for pedestrian flows, by formulating
the walking behavior as a differential game. However, they
do not solve the original problem or discuss a common
solution concept like equilibrium solutions. They eventually
transform the problem into an independent optimal control
problem based on interactive cost terms. They specifically
payed attention on reproducing human-like crowd behavior,
hence, their simulation based evaluation is qualitative and
assesses the macroscopic group behavior.
Our approach is to analyze human motion—in particu-
lar, the human avoidance behavior—from a game theoretic
perspective. Using game theory provides several advantages
over existing approaches. Compared tomerely reactivemeth-
ods, the key factor of game theory is the mutual anticipation
of the influence of other agents’ possible motions on oneself
and vice versa; costs (or payoffs) of own actions can depend
on decisions of others. Thus, future interactions are predicted
and incorporated which corresponds to human behavior.
Moreover, individual cost functions can be assigned to each
agent if desired. As a result, agents can behave asymmet-
rically which overcomes the restrictions of most of the
mentioned algorithms with anticipated collisions avoidance.
Learning based methods are very promising because of their
inherent usage of real, human motion data. This is at the
same time a drawback because their validity is dependent
on the versatility of the their experimental data. In contrast,
game theory offers a more general formulation with a vari-
ety of extensions and can apply learned cost functions as
well.
In this paper, interaction-aware decision making is for-
mulated as a non-cooperative game, whereas a static and a
dynamic representation is proposed. Navigational decisions
are predicted by calculating Nash equilibria dependent on
alternative cost functions form literature.We further evaluate
which combination of model and cost function approximates
recorded human navigation experiment best. Note, thatwe do
not present an operational motion planner or prediction algo-
rithm in this paper. The presented approach is based on our
previous work [80].We extend our analysis by also regarding
the Nash equilibria of dynamic games and by examining four
additional cost functions, which mainly perform better than
the previously used one. Further, a comparison between the
game theoretic decision model and a commonly used predic-
tion based one is conducted.
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3 Analyzing Interaction-Aware Navigation with
Game Theory
For a game theoretic formulation of human decision making
during navigation we consider two game formulations with
five different cost functions each. Then the solution concept
of Nash equilibria is used to predict possible outcomes of the
game. In the following, game theoretic terms and tools are
briefly explained and an illustrative example is given.
3.1 Defining Static and Dynamic Games
The two considered models are finite, non-cooperative, non-
zero-sum, perfect information games. However, one game is
static, the other one is dynamic. In the static case, decisions
are taken simultaneously, in contrast to deciding sequentially
in dynamic games. The termnon-cooperative refers to a game
theoretic branchwherein all agents aim tominimize their cost
individually.1 One speaks of a nonzero-sum game if the sum
of each agent’s costs can differ from zero. Keeping that in
mind, the components of the static game are defined by:
Definition 1 (Static Game) Finite, static, non-cooperative,
nonzero-sum game [44]:
1. Finite set of N players P = {P1, . . . , PN }.
2. Finite action setA = A1×· · ·×AN , whereAi is defined
for each player Pi ∈ P . Each a ji ∈ Ai is referred to as
an action of Pi , with j = {1, 2, . . . , Mi } and Mi being
the number of actions of Pi .
3. Cost function Ji : A1 × A2 × · · · × AN → R ∪ {∞} for
each player Pi ∈ P .
The game is finite if the number of actions is bounded for
all players. The subscript i always refers to the addressed
player. Each player Pi has different actions a
j
i ∈ Ai and a
cost function Ji . The superscript j refers to an action, and
a ji is the j th action out of Mi actions of player Pi .
In a static game, as defined above, the players decide once
and simultaneously. Hence, navigating agents are modeled
as if they observe the situation first, and then decide instinc-
tively. This assumption of humans using default collision
avoidance strategies is supported by Huber et al. [31].
Other studies [55,61] in turn state that the amount of
shared effort during the avoidance maneuvers is unequal,
depending on who is first. This indicates that humans
observe and react, which may be more accurately modeled
by considering sequential decisions. Dynamic games model
1 Non-cooperative in contrast to cooperative/coalitional games where
the focus is set on what groups of agents—rather than individuals—
can gain by forming coalitions. In a nutshell, coalitional game theory
answers two questions: which coalition will form, and how should that
coalition divide its payoff among its members [44, p. 70].
these situations where decisions during navigation are taken
sequentially. In this case, the property of perfect information
in games becomes important to get a complete definition
of the game. A game is a perfect information game if each
player perfectly knows about the actions of all players that
happened previously. Thus for the dynamic model of naviga-
tion, it is assumed that the agents choose consecutively, and
an instant after they observe the actions of the agents acting
before them. It is unclear if the static or dynamic model is
more accurate. Both models are evaluated and compared in
this work.
A mathematical description of a dynamic game is the
extensive form. This form emphasizes the sequential deci-
sion making. The components are given by:
Definition 2 (Dynamic Game) Finite, perfect information,
dynamic, non-cooperative, nonzero-sum game [44]:
1. Finite set of N players P = {P1, . . . , PN }.
2. Finite action set A = A1 × · · · × AN .
3. Set of terminal nodes Z .
4. Cost function Ji : Z → R ∪ {∞} for each Pi ∈ P .
5. Set of choice nodes H.
6. Action function χ : H → 2A; assigns each choice node
a set of possible actions.
7. Player function ρ : H → P; assigns each choice node a
player Pi ∈ P who chooses the action at the node.
8. Successor function σ : H × A → H ∪ Z; uniquely
assigns a choice node and an action a subsequent node.
Informally speaking, a dynamic game is a (graph theoretic)
tree, in which each node depicts a decision of one of the
agents, each edge depicts an action, and each leaf depicts a
final game outcome.
3.2 Solving Games: Strategies and the Nash
Equilibrium
The definitions introduced before withhold which actions
a player should choose. Game theorists introduced diverse
solution concepts that can be interpreted as an advice or used
as prediction of what is likely to happen. One of the most
famous solution concepts is the Nash equilibrium: it is an
allocationwhere no player can reduce the own cost by chang-
ing the strategy if the other players stick to their strategies.
Thus, a Nash equilibrium is a best response for everyone. It
implies that agents aim to minimize their own cost. This is
corroborated by existing literature stating that humans exe-
cute their motions by following a minimization principle.
Accordingly, humans minimize for example the energy con-
sumption of their gait [47,75], or the global length of their
paths [11]. Also psychologists claim that even infants expect
a moving agent as having goals which it aims to achieve in
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a rational way, like by taking the shortest path [19]. Because
these statements bring the Nash equilibrium into focus, we
concentrate on this solution concept. Nevertheless, another
solution concept—the Pareto optimality—is discussed and
briefly evaluated in Sect. 6.1.
Before presenting a mathematical definition of a Nash
equilibrium, the notion strategy is introduced because it dif-
fers for static and dynamic games. Similar for both types is
that each player Pi has to play a strategy s
j
i out of the strategy
set Si . This strategy can be pure or mixed. A pure strategy is
deterministic; whenever a pure strategy is played in a game,
the same actions are chosen. If a mixed strategy is played, a
pure strategy is chosen stochasticallywith a fixed probability.
Thus, a game may reach different outcomes with the same,
mixed strategy. In a static game, for a player Pi choosing
a pure strategy s ji ∈ Si is equivalent to choosing an action
a ji ∈ Ai , hence, s ji = a ji . Defining a strategy in the dynamic
case is more complex because one has to define for each
choice node of a player in H which action is to be played,
whether or not the choice node is reached during the game.
Thus, the pure strategies of a player Pi in a dynamic game
consist of theCartesian product
∏
h∈H,ρ(h)=Pi χ(h) [44]. For
further explanation an example is given in Sect. 3.4.
Keeping that in mind, we denote a combination of strate-
gies of each player as an allocation s = (s j1 , . . . , s jN ). ANash
equilibrium s∗ = (s j∗1 , . . . , s j
∗
N ) is marked with an asterisk
and is a best response for everyone, assuming possible strate-
gies and cost functions are common knowledge. It is defined
by:
Definition 3 (Nash equilibrium) The N -tuple of strategies
(s j
∗
1 , . . . , s
j∗
N ), with s
j∗
i ∈ Si , constitutes a non-cooperative
Nash equilibrium for a N -player game if the following N


































































Note that the existence of a Nash equilibrium is guaranteed
given that mixed strategies are allowed [52]. Choosing a spe-
cific form for the cost function Ji even ensures the existence
of a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies (see Sect. 3.3). Pos-
sible choices for such a Ji regarding human navigation are
discussed in the next section.
It is further important that theNash equilibrium is bounded
to two main assumptions: common knowledge of all players,
and strictly rational behavior of all players. Common knowl-
edge implies that all players know about the whole action
set and the cost functions. We assume that humans gain their
(common) knowledge through experience and their ability to
take perspective. Humans learn in their everyday life what
alternatives exist to reach a goal and how other people behave
while walking. At the same time humans are able to view a
situation from another’s point-of-view and infer about their
possible actions and intentions. Rational behavior is defined
as a behavior that maximizes an expected utility [17] (i.e.,
minimize expected cost). Section 6.1 discusses rationality
more detailed, as well as to which extent both assumptions
are justified for interaction-aware decision making during
navigation. In case either of these assumptions is violated,
game theory extensions are proposed.
3.3 Determining Cost Functions for Human Navigation
The mathematical definition of a Nash equilibrium in Defin-
ition 3 demonstrates that the accuracy of the game theoretic
prediction is dependent onboth the choice of the solution con-
cept and the cost function. This section presents five different
choices to rate the cost for human navigation. The evaluation
is presented in Sect. 4. Thereby, each cost function Ji consists
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Note that this partitioning clarifies that the game theoretic
formulation results in an independent set of optimal control
problems if no interaction occurs. Jˆ is only dependent on the
action a ji that player Pi considers. It rates for example the
length or time of the trajectory. The interactive component J˜i
namely contains the interactive cost. It is not only dependent
on the own choice of action but also on the other players’
actions.
Four of the considered cost functions (I–IV) assume that
humans prefer trajectories that are, above all, without colli-
sion and otherwise minimize their cost with respect to their
free-space motion. The fifth cost function (V) contains an
additional cost term that rates how close humans pass each
other, hence, shares some characteristics with the social force
model. This cost function will be discussed last. For the other
four cost functions a common interactive component J˜i can
be defined.
Cost Function I–IV The cost functions consider a collision
to be the only possible interaction.
J˜ I−IVi
(
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J˜ I−IVi becomes infinity in case that action a
j
i leads to a colli-
sion with the strategy of another player, otherwise the term is
zero. An action corresponds to a discrete trajectory with the
states x(t), with a ji = (x(1), x(2), . . . , x(T )). Two trajecto-
ries collide if the Euclidean distance between two positions
is smaller than a threshold R at any time t .
By choosing a cost function in the form of Eq. (2) with
Eq. (3), the existence of a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies
is guaranteed: a player’s cost is either Jˆ (a ji ) or infinity. If it is
infinity for a special allocation, all other players with whom
a collision would occur also have infinite cost. But this is not
a best response for any player (only in case all actions of a
player would result in a collision).
In the following, the choices for the independent compo-
nent Jˆ of the first four cost functions are presented. Two of
them need a trajectory as input, the other ones merely need
the path information.
Cost Function I A frequently used cost function in motion










Another cost function using path input is given by
Papadopoulos et al. [57]. They learned the parameters of a
cost function by studying the geometry of the path in free-
space andbyusing inverse optimal control. Theirmodel bases
on non-holonomic motions along a path that is approximated
by line segments with the state vector x(k) = [x, y, ϕ]T at
the kth segment of the path. x and y denote positions and
ϕ the orientation. Their cost function depends only on the
shape of the path and is invariant to changes of the velocity.
x(k + 1) = x(k) + λ(k) cos(ϕ(k))
y(k + 1) = y(k) + λ(k) sin(ϕ(k))
ϕ(k + 1) = ϕ(k) + λ(k)κ(k),
(5)
with κ being the curvature and λ(k) being the length of the
kth segment. Let K be the total number of segments. Then a
possible cost function is:
Cost Function II The cost function is based on Eq. (5) and
accounts for the energy related to the curvature, and for the









λ(k)(κ(k))2(1 + cT Δx2(k)), (6)
with Δx2 = [(x(k) − x(K ))2, (y(k) − y(K ))2, (ϕ(k) −
ϕ(K ))2]T and cT = [125, 42, 190]. The distances from the
current state to the goal state can be interpreted as space-
varying weights on the curvature [57].
Both mentioned cost functions are path and thus not
velocity dependent. Another possibility is to use trajectory
information. Consequently, we also consider the following
cost functions.
Cost Function IIIThe function rates thedurationT needed











A more complex cost function is given by Mombaur
et al. [50] who studied the run of human locomotor tra-
jectories during goal-directed walking in free-space. They
state that human trajectories are optimized according to an
underlying principle which was learned with inverse opti-
mal control. In contrast to cost function Jˆ II, they assume
the motion model to be holonomic with the state vector
x(t) = [x, y, ϕ, vforw, vang, vorth]T and the control vector
u(t) = [uforw, uang, uorth]T (forward, angular, orthogonal
acceleration).
Cost Function IV The cost function assigns a cost for the
execution time T needed (as in Eq. (7)). Additionally, it
favors sparse accelerations and the human to be oriented
towards the goal.








with u(t)2 = [u2forw, u2ang, u2orth, ψ2]Tt , and ψ being the dif-
ference between the angular difference to the goal denoted
as z = [x(T ), y(T )]T and the human body orientation ϕ;






The parameter vector is cT = [1.2, 1.7, 0.7, 5.2] [50].
The last cost function is adopted in large parts from Pel-
legrini et al. [60]. They showed that a tracking algorithm
performs better if it takes social interactions between pedes-
trians into account as well as their orientation towards a goal.
Minimizing a learned cost function allowed for calculating
the next expected velocity of the tracked object. This cost
function is used here to rate a whole trajectory. A holonomic
motion model with the state vector x(t) = [x, y]T and the
control vector u(t) = [vx , vy]T is chosen.
Cost Function VThe cost function rates if a trajectory leads
towards its goal andmaintains a desired speed. Additionally,
it rewards trajectories that steer an agent away from an
expected point of closest approach to another agent.
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JˆV(a ji ) :=
T (a ji )∑
t=0
c1G(t) + c2V(t) (9)
J˜Vi (a
j













G(t) is dependent on the goal z = [x(T ), y(T )]T , and V(t)
depends on a desired speed vdes, with
G(t) = − (z − x(t))
Tu(t)
‖z − x(t)‖‖u(t)‖ , V(t) = (vdes − ‖u(t)‖)
2.
Each fellow player of Pi gets assigned a weight wn(t) deter-
mined by distances and angular displacements of players to
each other.2 The additional interactive cost resulting from









where d2in(t) is the square distance between the positions
of Pi and Pn at the expected point of closest approach.
The calculation of that point is based on a constant veloc-
ity assumption. It is similar to the social force model, but
differs in a crucial way: instead of modeling humans at their
current positions, the expected point of closest approach is
predicted andused as origin of the repulsion.This implies that
humans include prediction into the motion planning, rather
than being reactive particles [60]. The parameter vector is
cT = [c1, c2, σ ] = [2.073, 2.330, 0.361] [60].
3.4 Formulating Interaction-Aware Decision Making
with Game Theory
In this section, the game theoretic tools described above
are applied to a navigational decision problem. A static and
dynamic game is set up and their Nash equilibria are calcu-
lated. Thereby, a mapping between game theoretic terms and
navigational components is given with the aid of an exam-
ple illustrating the navigation on a pavement. The example is
depicted in Fig. 2 where two agents want to pass each other.
First, we map the components of a static game in Def-
inition 1 to the pavement scenario. The two agents are the
players P1 and P2. Choosing an action a
j
i is equivalent to
choosing a trajectory. In the example inFig. 2, eachplayer can
choose one out of five trajectories, thus the action set of Pi is
Ai = {a1i , a2i , . . . , a5i }. In the static case, thismirrors directly
the set of pure strategies Si = {s1i , . . . , s5i } = {a1i , . . . , a5i }.
Figure 3 assigns each action a trajectory and shows the cost
2 For a detailed calculation please refer to [60].
Fig. 2 Example for interaction-aware navigation of humans on a pave-
ment. Interaction may be a mutual avoidance maneuver. The situation
is modeled as a static game in Table 1 and Fig. 3 and as a dynamic game
in Fig. 4
Fig. 3 Illustration of Fig. 2 as static game. The actions of each player
and the cost of the trajectories are shown (assuming it is collision-free)
Table 1 Static game
P1\P2 a12 a22 a32 a42 a52
a11 5|5 5|4 5|1 ∞ ∞
a21 4|5 4|4 ∞ ∞ ∞
a31 1|5 ∞ ∞ ∞ 1|3
a41 ∞ ∞ ∞ 2|2 2|3
a51 ∞ ∞ 3|1 3|2 3|3
The cells depict cost pairs J1|J2 dependent on actions a ji . Actions and
corresponding cost are shown in Fig. 3. In case of a collision the cost
is infinity. Nash equilibria are circled
component Jˆ , that choosing a trajectory entails (assuming
it is collision-free). The cost is chosen such that it is pro-
portional to the length of the path and that passing right




2 ) of a player
depending on the allocation are written down in a matrix as
shown in Table 1, where each cell contains a cost pair J1|J2.
After all components aremapped, the pureNash equilibria
of the game are computed. In the static, two-player case the
inequalities in Eq. (1) reduce to:
J1
(












∀s j1 ∈ S1,
J2
(












∀s j2 ∈ S2.
(11)
Informally speaking, a cell in Table 1 (i.e., an allocation)
is a pure Nash equilibrium if a) the cost entry J1 is less or
equal than all other costs J1 in its column and b) the cost
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Fig. 4 Dynamic representation of the pavement example in Fig. 2.
The upper part shows the actions of the players with its corresponding
cost without collision. The lower part is the tree representation of the
dynamic game with the cost pairs J1|J2 at the leafs (the first entry
refers to P1, the second to P2, respectively). The subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium is circled
entry J2 is less or equal than all other costs J2 in its row.
Four allocations satisfy both conditions. They are circled in
Table 1. For example, the allocation s∗ = (s3∗1 , s5∗2 ) is a
Nash equilibrium. Choosing this equilibrium means that the




In case that the agents decide sequentially, the dynamic
game is used. Definition 2 is applied on the pavement
situation in Fig. 2. The dynamic game is depicted as a
tree. However, its illustration gets confusing with too many
branch-offs. For that reason the example is altered by only
regarding three possible trajectories for each agent as shown
in Fig. 4. This leads to the action set A = A1 × A2 =
{aL1 , aM1 , aR1 , aL2 , aM2 , aR2 }. Similar to the static game, we
have two players P1 and P2. However, a player function ρ is
needed that states the agent acting first. For this example P1
is chosen. After observing one out of three actions of P1, P2
reacts by playing one of his actions in turn. This results in the
tree shown in Fig. 4. The terminal nodes—the leafs—assign
the cost for each player as defined by the cost function Ji .
The cost functions are the same as in the static game.
One major difference between static and dynamic games
lies in their strategy space. P1 has one choice node and
three actions, thus 31 = 3 different strategies with with
S1 = {s11 , s21 , s31} = {aL1 , aM1 , aR1 }. More interesting, player
P2 has three choice nodes, thus already 33 = 27 strategies,
S2 = {s12 , . . . , s272 } = {(aL2 , aL2 , aL2 ), (aR2 , aL2 , aL2 ), . . . }.
The number of strategies is that highbecause onehas to define
a choice of action for each choice node. The reason why this
refinement is necessary is that a Nash equilibrium was orig-
inally defined for static games. For the definition in Eq. (1)
to be still valid for the dynamic game, one has to define the
strategies such that they state for each choice node of a player
which action is to be played—whether or not the choice
node is reached during the game [44]. However, this defi-
nition allows for unlikely equilibrium solutions in a dynamic
game. For example, one of theNash equilibria in the dynamic
case is the allocation s∗ = (aL∗1 , (aM2 , aM2 , aL2 )∗). It fulfills
the conditions in Eq. (1): none of the players would benefit
from changing only the own strategy. However, this would
be merely the case if P2 ‘threatens’ to provoke a collision by
playing aM2 as reaction to a
M
1 , and a
L
2 as reaction to a
R
1 . Actu-
ally carrying out this threat would yet not be the best response
of P2. P1 can assume this to be an unlikely behavior and thus
a non-credible threat. Also experience proves that humans
rarely collide. They avoid collisions rather than provoking
them. This example shows that in dynamic games the notion
of a Nash equilibrium can be too weak [44]. For that reason,
the stricter subgame-perfect equilibria is used for dynamic
games in this work. Thus, equilibria that imply the threat
to provoke a collision are excluded. A Nash equilibrium is
subgame-perfect if it constitutes a Nash equilibrium in every
subgame of the complete game. An example of a subgame is
shown in Fig. 4. It consists of a node within the tree and all its
subsequent nodes. In our example, the only subgame-perfect
Nash equilibrium is s∗ = (aM∗1 , (aM2 , aR2 , aM2 )∗).
From now on, we will slightly abuse the notation of strate-
gies in dynamic games. Instead of giving a combination of
actions for each choice node, only the best response tra-
jectory of the second player to the first player’s decision is
stated. For example the subgame-perfect equilibrium reduces
to s∗ = (aM∗1 , aR∗2 ) = (sM∗1 , sR∗2 ), where aR2 it the best
response to aM1 (circled cost pair in Fig. 4).
In this context we want to discuss the link between game
theory and optimal control. As mentioned before, the prob-
lem formulation of game theory results in a set of coupled
optimal control problems. Nevertheless, the specific com-
bination of a dynamic game that contains only the binary
component J˜ I−IVi in Eq. (3) as interactive part can also be
reformulated by several independent optimal control prob-
lems. Therefore, all actions of the agent choosing first that
inevitably lead to a collision with a following agent are
removed. After that, it is sufficient that the agent choosing
first only minimizes its independent cost component Jˆ I−IV,
which is independent of the actions of the other agents. The
agents acting afterwards choose their trajectory based on
independent optimizations with the already played actions
as constraints.
4 Evaluation Method
We evaluate if the Nash equilibria in either of the proposed
game setups sufficiently reproduce the decision process
during human navigation. Or differently phrased: we are
interested inwhether or not Nash’s solutionmirrors a human-
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Fig. 5 Experimental setup;
colored papers marked possible
start/goal positions, markers
were put on the subjects and
their positions over time was
recorded
Fig. 6 Experimental setup of a
navigation scene. Both pictures
show scene 1C-A3 wherein the
subjects were repeatedly asked
to walk over field ‘1’ to ‘C’, and
over field ‘A’ to ‘3’, respectively.
A subset of the recorded
trajectories is drawn into the
picture on the right
like navigation behavior. We consider a Nash equilibrium
allocation to be human-like if it proposes the same—or at
least an alike—solution as a humanwould choose. The valid-
ity of the Nash solution is assessed separately for both game
models, each in combination with one of the five cost func-
tions.
This section presents the experimental setup used to cap-
ture the motion data, the game setup, and the statistical
analysis used to test the presented approach. The steps with
their inputs and outputs are shown in Fig. 9. It illustrates that
the purpose of the experiment is to capture human trajec-
tories which can be used as action sets for the game setup.
Importantly, the validation is based entirely on humanmotion
data to ensure that the action set contains valid human behav-
ior. The next step—the game theoretic analysis—calculates
all allocations that constitute a Nash equilibrium. Then the
validity of the Nash solution is tested by comparing their
similarity to human solutions by applying a Bootstrap test.
At the end of this section, an alternative decision model to
game theory based on independent prediction is introduced.
It serves as a further baseline for the performance evaluation
of the proposed decision model.
4.1 Experimental Setup
In order to acquire a set of human walking trajectories, we
repeatedly recorded the motion of two persons passing each
other. Thereby, the start and goal positions changed partly.
As preparation three possible start and end positions were
marked with colored DinA4 papers on the floor and at eye
level. The setup of the papers as well as the dimensions of
the recording area is shown in Figs. 5 and 6. The distance
between the edges of the papers was chosen to be 0.4 m.
During the experiment two participants facing each other
were advised to walk over previously selected start and goal
positions. Thereby, they started one meter in front of the
actual starting marker such that the acceleration phase was
beyond the recorded area (compare Fig. 6). Start and goal
positions were known to both participants. Overall, 17 dif-
ferent start/goal configurations were chosen such that the
covered distance in a whole was the same for each person.
Thereby, the paths crossed in 10 out of 17 cases. All chosen
configurations are listed in Fig. 10. Here, a configuration of
start/goal positions including the two recorded trajectories is
called scene and named according to the start and goal posi-
tions. For example, the scene shown in Fig. 6 on the left is
scene 1C-A3. In our previous work [80], we already showed
the existence of interaction in most of these scenes by com-
paring them to free-space motions.
In order to create our database, eight healthy subjects
(mean age ± SD: 27 ± 2.7 years) were recorded. Each of
the 17 scenes was repeated ten times for two pairs of sub-
jects, and five times for the other pairs leading to [in total:
(4 · 10 · 17) + (4 · 5 · 17)] 1020 trajectories. The sequence of
scenes was randomized differently for all subjects.
The human motion was recorded with the vision based
motion capture system Qualisys.3 Thereby, reflective mark-
erswere put on each person and the positions of thesemarkers
were recorded over time (at 204 Hz). After that, the mean
position of the markers was calculated at each time step
for each person and smoothed with a Butterworth filter (4th
order, 0.01 cutoff frequency [50]) in order to filter the torso
oscillations caused by the steps. The distribution of the five
markers is shown in Fig. 5. It was chosen by following the
3 http://www.qualisys.com/.
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Fig. 7 Illustration of the
actions of game 1C-A3. Actions
that are incorporated into action
set A are drawn solid, others are
dashed. All trajectories going
from 1 to C out of the scenes
1C-A3 and 1C-A2 constitute
A1. The set A2 consists of all
trajectories going from A to 3
out of the scenes 1C-A3 and
2B-A3. Table 2 shows the
corresponding bi-matrix, the
grey area maps actions to entries
in the matrix
setup in [50]. However, we neglected the markers on the
knee and feet such that the mean constitutes approximately
the center of mass of the torso. The resulting discrete trajec-
tories constitute the actions in the game theoretic setup.
4.2 Game Theoretic Setup
Each of the 17 scenes with different start/end configurations
can be represented as an individual game. They differ from
each other by the action sets. In the following, the game setup
is shown by the example of game 1C-A3 (Fig. 6). First, the
static game is discussed. A bi-matrix is set up (Table 2) and
the components in Definition 1 are mapped:
1. The player set P consists of the two subjects.
2. The action set A consists of the action set A1 and A2. In
the game 1C-A1, A1 contains all trajectories a j,1C1 that
P1 walked during the experiment starting at ‘1’ going to
‘C’—not just the trajectories of all scenes 1C-A3. For
a better understanding compare with Fig. 7 and the cor-
responding bi-matrix in Table 2. Here a subset of A1 is
drawn as solid lines in green (left, scenes 1C-A3) and
black (middle, scenes 1C-A2). This means, all the trajec-
tories of other scenes with ’1C’, as 1C-A2 or 1C-B1, are
also part of the action set because they constitute valid
ways to get from ‘1’ to ‘C’.
Likewise, the action setA2 contains all trajectories a j,A32
that were captured while P2 was walking from ‘A’ to
‘3’. They are drawn as solid lines in green (left, scenes
1C-A3) and black (right, scenes 2B-A3).
3. Each allocation s = (s j1 , s j2 ) = (a j,1C1 , a j,A32 ) is rated
with a cost function as in Eq. (2) for each player. The
bi-matrix in Table 2 is constructed by using cost func-
tion Jˆ IV. The collision radius R is chosen individually
for each pair of subjects by identifying the minimum
recorded distance from all simultaneous walks.
Table 2 Reduced bi-matrix of the game 1C-A3 (Fig. 7)
Reference trajectory allocations are marked bold, the Nash equilibrium
is circled
Second, we model the game 1C-A3 dynamically (Defini-
tion 2). The players, action sets and cost functions remain the
same as for the static game. In contrast, the strategy space
changes because dynamic games can have a sequence of
actions. However, this sequence needs to be defined before-
hand. According to the human avoidance studies in [55,61],
the agent coming first adopts the trajectory less. This indi-
cates that this agent chooses first while the other one reacts.
Thus, we determine for each scene and each pair of subjects
which subject was more often the one entering the recorded
area first. In Sect. 5, both options, that this player acts either
first or second, are evaluated.
After setting up the game, the Nash equilibria are calcu-
lated. In Table 2 the bi-matrix of the game 1C-A3 is shown,
for clarity the action set is reduced. The only Nash equilib-
riumof the (reduced) static game is circled: it is the allocation
s∗ = (a4∗,1C1 , a2∗,A32 ). This corresponds to a pair of tra-
jectories, one trajectory for P1 and one trajectory for P2,
respectively. It is denoted as equilibrium trajectory pair.
We assume that human interaction-aware decisionmaking
during navigation can be approximated with the Nash equi-
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Fig. 8 Illustration of the recorded trajectories and sets used to analyze
the game 1C-B2 for one of the subject pairs
librium solutions from game theory. This is only true if these
equilibrium trajectory pairs constitute a provable human-like
solution. In order to test the assumption, real human solution
pairs are needed to serve as ground truth to which the equilib-
rium pairs are compared. Such pairs will be called reference
trajectory pairs. They are the simultaneously recorded trajec-
tories of a scene. For example, the subjectswere asked towalk
from ’1’ to ’C’ and from ’A’ to ’3’, respectively. This leads
to a captured trajectory pair (a˜ j,1C1 , a˜
j,A3
2 ). This trajectory
pair can be used as ground truth for game 1C-A3. In the fol-
lowing, reference trajectory pairs are tagged with a tilde. As
each scene was repeatedly captured during the experiment,
several reference trajectory pairs exist for each game. The
set containing all reference trajectory pairs (a˜ j,1C1 , a˜
j,A3
2 ) is
denoted as R1C-A3. The elements of its complement R1C-A3
are (a j,1C1 , a
j,A3
2 ). Additionally, the set E1C-A3 is defined that
contains all equilibrium pairs (a j∗,1C1 , a
j∗,A3
2 ) of a game. Its
elements can be elements of both R1C-A3 and R1C-A3. By
applying this to our example in Table 2, the sets areR1C-A3 =
{(a˜1,1C1 , a˜1,A32 ), (a˜2,1C1 , a˜2,A32 ), (a˜3,1C1 , a˜3,A32 )} (bold pairs)
and E1C-A3 = {(a4∗,1C1 , a2∗,A32 )} (circled).
For further illustration, the recorded trajectories (i.e.,
actions) of another game (1C-B2) are drawn in Fig. 8. The
actions are assigned different colors that represent the dif-
ferent trajectory pair sets. In this example one equilibrium
trajectory pair exists (drawn in violet). The reference trajec-
tories are green and the remaining trajectories are black.
4.3 Similarity Measurement
In order to test the proposed approach, we check if the equi-
librium trajectory pairs in E1C-A3 are more similar to the
reference pairs inR1C-A3 than the other pairs inR1C-A3. The
similarity is measured with the Dynamic Time Warping dis-
tance δ. The distance δ is zero if two time series are identical,
hence, the smaller the value of the distance the more simi-
lar they are. The algorithm is used because it can compare
trajectories that differ in the number of time steps. Gillian et
al. [25] explain how to apply it for multi-dimensional time
series (e.g., trajectories).
The Dynamic TimeWarping distance between two trajec-
tories is denoted as δ(a˜li , a
j
i ), where a˜
l
i is the tested reference
trajectory and a ji the one that is tested against. In order to
compare a reference trajectory pair to another pair of trajecto-
ries, the twoDynamic TimeWarping distances are calculated















Note that only trajectories of the same player are compared.
All trajectory pair distances between the elements of R1C-A3
and E1C-A3, R1C-A3 and R1C-A3 are calculated respectively,
leading to two additional sets. They are the output of the
similarity measurement step (compare Fig. 9):
– Set D1C-A3E ; contains all trajectory pair distances d of the
possible comparison between the elements of E1C-A3 and
R1C-A3.
– Set D1C-A3R ; contains all trajectory pair distances d of the
possible comparison between the elements ofR1C-A3 and
R1C-A3.
As mentioned above, only one pair of subjects has been con-
sidered so far. Considering all pairs of subjects is done by
repeating the game setup and similaritymeasurement step for
each pair of subjects. The resulting distance sets are merged.
For simplicity we denoted the merged sets as D1C-A3E and
D1C-A3R , too.
4.4 Statistical Validation Method
After calculating the sets D1C-A3E and D1C-A3R , we are inter-
ested in whether or not the values in D1C-A3E are mostly
smaller than the values inD1C-A3R . Therefore, the null hypoth-
esis H0 is defined to be:
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Fig. 9 Pipeline of the evaluation showing the inputs and outputs of each step for the analysis of the game 1C-A3. In favor of clarity, the superscripts
of the sets that index the game (e.g., E1C-A3) are omitted
Null hypothesis H0: The median values of the distribu-
tions from which the two samples DE and DR are obtained
are the same.
We test against this null hypothesis by computing the p
value with a one-sided Bootstrap test [21] using a 5% signif-
icance level. We use Bootstrap, a resampling method widely
used in statistical inference, because the true distributions are
unknown and the considered sample sizes of some scenes are
too small (in some cases <30) for inference based on the t-
distribution.
Since 17 different scenes are regarded, 17 Bootstrap tests
are necessary. In order to overcome themultiple testing prob-
lem, the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure [8] was used to
adjust the significance level of the p values.
4.5 Baseline Comparison: Prediction Based Decision
In order to further evaluate the game theoretic approach, its
performance is compared to the performance of a predic-
tion based decision model. Therefore, a model is used where
each agent independently predicts the future motions of sur-
rounding agents first and decides afterwards which trajectory
to take based on the prediction. It is a model that—like the
presented one—anticipates collisions and assumes humans
to be more than merely reacting particles. However, it omits
the reasoning about possible other motions of agents.
For the experimental setup of two persons passing each
other, the prediction based decision model is realized as
follows. Again the setup of the game 1C-A3 is used as exam-
ple. Both persons know the current position, velocity and
goal of the other person. Based on this knowledge and the
assumption that persons move with constant velocity to their
goal, person P1 predicts the future trajectory of P2, and vice
versa. Note, that this differs from a merely constant veloc-
ity approach because the goal is known. Only the way to
the goal is predicted. The predictions are denoted as a1C,pred1
and aA3,pred2 . Then P1 chooses a trajectory that minimizes




2 )), ∀a j,1C1 ∈ A1. P2




2 )), ∀a j,A32 ∈ A2.





human-likeness of this decision is validated with the same
approach as for the equilibrium trajectory pairs as illustrated
in Fig. 9. The only difference is that, instead of using game
theory to decide on which trajectory pair to take, the predic-
tion based decision models is used.
5 Results
The results of the statistical validation with the Bootstrap
tests will be presented in this section. It is followed by the
results of the alternative prediction based decisionmodel and
a discussion and potential shortcomings.
5.1 Static Game Model
First, the results of the evaluation of the Nash equilibria in
static games are presented. Table 3 shows for how many
tests (out of 17) the null hypothesis (see Sect. 4.4) was
rejected after using the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure. All
five choices of the cost function Ji are listed. Additionally,
the corresponding p values are shown in Table 6.
The best result was achieved using J Ii , the length of a tra-
jectory. In this case, the equilibrium pairs are more similar
to the reference pairs than other possible solutions for all 17
tests.Allmedianvalues of the trajectory pair distances related
to the equilibrium pairs are significantly smaller. For illus-
tration, the confidence intervals of the medians are shown in
Fig. 10. They are also calculated with a Bootstrap test using a
5 % significance level. Note that none of the confidence inter-
vals overlap. This means, that the theory of Nash equilibria
in static games using J Ii is indeed suitable to approximate
the decision process behind human avoidance maneuvers
because it chooses the same, or at least similar, trajectories
as the subjects did. Almost as good performed the other path
based cost function J IIi rating curvature; the null hypothesis
was rejected in 16 cases.
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Table 3 Evaluation results for static game modeling
Input Cost function Ji H0 rejected
(out of 17)
Path J Ii (Length) 17 (100%)
J IIi (Papadopoulos et al. [57]) 16 (94%)
Trajectory J IIIi (Time) 14 (82%)
J IVi (Mombaur et al. [50]) 13 (76%)
JVi (Pellegrini et al. [60]) 10 (59%)
Table 6 lists the p values of all 17 tests in detail (left column)



















trajectory pair distance d
DE
DR
Fig. 10 Static game modeling. The 95% confidence intervals of the
medians of the trajectory pair distances are shown for cost function J Ii
(Length) (compare Table 3). DE referes to the similarity of the Nash
equilibrium trajectory pairs to the ground truth, DR referes to the set of
remaining possible trajectory pairs, respectively. If they do not overlap
the difference is significant and H0 is rejected
Table 3 further reveals that the two cost functions regard-
ing the path seem to represent the human behavior more
accurately than the ones regarding trajectory cost. More-
over, the elemental cost functions—i.e., cost for length J Ii
or time J IIIi —tend to achieve better results than the respec-
tive learning based cost functions J IIi , J
IV
i . Since they were
learned in free-space, these functions may be too specific
for the direct usage in an environment populated by humans.
Both learned cost functions include either a cost for time or
length, however, also add a goal dependent cost. For exam-
ple, J IVi charges an additional cost if the agent is not facing
the goal. One could argue that this goal driven behavior
becomes less important in such environments while mini-
mizing time/length is still a prevalent aim of humans.
The worst result was achieved for JVi , which shares char-
acteristics with the social force model. This cost function
often leads to equilibrium pairs that are further apart than the
respective pairs of the cost functions that merely consider
collisions in the interactive component. Apparently, JVi sets
to much emphasis on proximity when applied in a game the-
oretic setup for the presented scenario.
5.2 Dynamic Game Model
If a scene is modeled as a dynamic game, we assume that the
subject whowasmore often the first one to enter the recorded
area is allowed to choose first. In the tables this player will
be marked with a circled one, hence, P 1©i . In order to assess
if our assumption holds and if the order makes a difference,
each dynamic game is played twice; ones with the player
P 1©i choosing first and ones with P
1©
i choosing second. After
that, the human-likeness of the Nash solution is validated as
described previously. Table 4 summarizes the results and the
corresponding p values are listed in detail in Table 6.
The null hypothesis is rejected for the majority of the tests
if P 1©i chooses first. The sequence of which cost performs
best is similar to the static model, however, the number of
rejected null hypothesis is lower in each case. Only JVi per-
forms similarly well in the static and dynamic setup, but is
still the weakest. The best result was again achievedwith cost
function J Ii (Length). Additionally, the results indicate that
games with J Ii are the ones being the most affected by chang-
ing the playing order. This result is in line with the studies
from Pettré et al. [61] which state that the person giving way
needs to make a larger avoidance maneuver. Opposed to that
is cost function J IIIi ; here the number of rejected hypotheses
slightly increases if P 1©i chooses second.
5.3 Prediction Based Decision Model
The results for the validation of the decision model based
on constant velocity to the goal prediction is summarized in
Tables 5 and 6. Similar to the static game, the path based
cost functions perform better than the trajectory based ones,
however, all cost functions perform clearly worse thanwithin
the static or dynamicmodel. Especially clear is the difference
for JVi : only for two scenes, out of 17, the suggested trajectory
pairs are more similar to the reference pairs than a randomly
picked pair.
5.4 Discussion
The result that the prediction based decision model per-
formed worse than the game theoretic decision model is in
linewith Trautman et al. [78]: it indicates that it is insufficient
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Table 4 Evaluation results for
dynamic game modeling






Path J Ii (Length) 13 (76%) 10 (59%)
J IIi (Papadopoulos et al. [57]) 12 (71%) 12 (71%)
Trajectory J IIIi (Time) 12 (71%) 13 (76%)
J IIIi (Mombaur et al. [50]) 12 (71%) 11 (65%)
JVi (Pellegrini et al. [60]) 10 (59%) 7 (41%)
Table 6 lists the p values of all 17 tests in detail (center and right column)
Table 5 Evaluation results for prediction based decision model
Input Cost function Ji H0 rejected
(out of 17)
Path J Ii (Length) 10 (59%)
J IIi (Papadopoulos et al. [57]) 10 (59%)
Trajectory J IIIi (Time) 8 (47%)
J IVi (Mombaur et al. [50]) 8 (47%)
JVi (Pellegrini et al. [60]) 2 (12%)
tomerely include prediction, even if the goal of the surround-
ing person is known. It is advantageous andmore human-like
to consider interaction-awareness. Game theory is a suitable
way to formulate the reasoning about possible interaction of
actions and approximates the human decision process during
navigation more accurately than the prediction based model.
The numbers in Tables 3 and 4 further imply that the static
game is more accurate than the dynamic one. Nevertheless,
there is no significant difference between any of the medians
of the twoDE sets in the static anddynamic case, respectively.
A reason why the null hypothesis was less rejected in the
dynamic case may be that the set E is smaller if only the
sub-game perfect Nash equilibria are considered. This results
in a smaller sample size and thus in a lower confidence by
determining the median. This may be resolved by recording
more subjects.
Notwithstanding the above, another reason why the
dynamic model is less accurate may be the policy for eval-
uating P 1©i . It may be too restricted in cases where the
player choosing first is not fixed but swaps repeatedly, thus
is independent from the scene. This is omitted in the current
validation method. On the one hand, P 1©i is merely the sub-
ject who was more often the first within the recorded area,
but not always. On the other hand, the equilibrium trajec-
tory pairs in E are compared to all reference pairs in R of a
game. This issue can be addressed by reducing the setR such
that it only contains the trajectory pairs of a scene wherein
the player choosing first is indeed the one who entered the
recorded area first. We yet refrained from doing so because
for some tests the sample sizewould shrink toomuch tomake
a reliable statement.
Surprisingly, the performance of the only cost function
that includes proximity cost, i.e. social cost, is always the
weakest. As mentioned above, this is probably because it
favors trajectories that are too far apart. However, social force
features in cost functions are still worth to be considered. As
mentioned inSect. 2,Vasquez et al. [82] investigated different
cost features. They concluded that social forces showed the
best results for the learned scenes while being at the same
time the ones generalizing worst for unknown scenes. This
may have also happened for the used data set.
Finally, a number of potential shortcomings need to be
considered. First, the study was limited to two person games.
Extending it to several persons should still maintain the
results because more persons means less collision-free tra-
jectories. Only those are chosen as Nash equilibrium and
are hence more similar to the ground truth. Second, the pre-
sented models assume that humans only decide ones and,
thus, a sequence of decisions or changing a decision is not
captured in the model yet. An exact model should always
choose one the reference pairs. However, building an exact
model would only work if every detail of decision making
during navigation is known and included. A game may also
have several equilibria and the theory of Nash is indifferent
towards the question which equilibrium the players should
choose eventually. Therefore, the accuracy of the model can
be further enhanced and potential extensions are discussed
in the next section.
6 Extensions and Applications
The following section looks beyond the horizon of the pre-
sented method. The first part of the section calls attention to
possible extensions of the presented game theoretic models.
The second part discusses if the results can be further applied
to robots since the evaluation focuses on humans.
6.1 Further Analysis and Potential Extensions
Apart from comparing static and dynamic games, we addi-
tionally looked into another game theoretic solution concept
for static games, the Pareto optimality [44]. A Pareto optimal
outcome is an allocation in which it is impossible to reduce
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the cost of any player without raising the cost of at least
one other player. Thus, Pareto optimality has some notion
of ‘fairness’, while the Nash concept assumes rational play-
ers, which merely minimize their own cost. Nash equilibria
are mostly Pareto inefficient [34]. However, choosing a cost
function of the form as in Eq. (2) with Eq. (3) results in the
set of Pareto optimal allocations being a subset of the Nash
equilibrium allocations. For example, in the game in Table 1
the cost of the Pareto optimal allocations are (3|1), (2|2) and
(1|3). As a consequence, the statistical comparison between
the two sets of trajectory pair distances—one set using the
Nash concept, and one set using Pareto optimality—revealed
no significant results for the four cost function using the inter-
active component as defined in Eq. (3). Nevertheless, Pareto
optimality is worth to be considered if further interactive
components are added to the cost function (e.g., keeping a
comfortable distance). In this case the Nash equilibria and
Pareto optimal allocations coincide less and a comparison
is more expressive. Accordingly, additional tests reveal that
the performance increases for JVi if Pareto efficiency is used
as solution concept: in 15 cases the null hypothesis can be
rejected (instead of 10 cases with Nash, see Table 3).
A consequence of the presentedmodel is that players need
to coordinate their choices and “agree upon” an equilibrium.
Rules on how humans come to an agreement are studied
in coordination games [18]. The agreement can be based
on facts like in cases where one of the equilibria is payoff
superior or less risky, but also on social rules. An especially
interesting extension for navigation is to include traffic rules
into the formulation.
The mentioned models and extensions all assume that the
agents behave rationally in a sense that they minimize their
expected cost. They also imply common knowledge (see
Sect. 3.2). Researchers within different sub-fields of game
theory yet argue that the common knowledge assumption and
the conventionally defined rationality “is not characteristic of
human social interaction in general” [17]. An apparent case
where common knowledge is hard to imply is if the number
of agents is too large. The conditions may also be violated
if it is required to plan far ahead in the future or if the prob-
lem is complex (e.g., for games like Chess or Go). These
are different facets of bounded rationality, which is deliber-
ately omitted in this work. So far we focus on well-known
and studied game theoretic approaches. They are evaluated
for the presented task and compared among each other and to
prior work. Thinking at the application of navigating humans
in populated environments, we assume the number of poten-
tial players to be uncritical. Also the planning horizon while
walking is within seconds rather than minutes. Nevertheless,
game theoretic approaches that consider bounded rationality
may further improve our model and are highly applicable
for crowd simulations. For an overview see [68]. Other rele-
vant concerns are raised by behavioral/psychological game
theorists [2,13]. They refer to various experimental results
wherein people seemingly do not decide rational, mean-
ing act differently as predicted by the theory of Nash. The
rationality assumption is often questioned in social decision
problems wherein prior beliefs or emotions influence the
decision. Both are hard to pin down in utility functions since
in the world we can usually only measure pecuniary payoffs
or cost [17]. It is one of the greatest challenges to define
a perfectly correct analytic model of the human decision
process. Camerer yet comments in [17] that “many weak-
nesses of game theory are cured by new models that embody
simple cognitive principles, while maintaining the formal-
ism and generality that make game theory useful”. We want
to introduce game theory as an effective method to model
interactivity during navigation, doing so by starting with ele-
mentary game models that are step-wise refined in future
work, among others with approaches from behavioral game
theory. A promising next step is for example the fairness
equilibrium [13] that namely includes human sense of fair-
ness into the utilities.
6.2 Relevance for Robot Motion Planning among
Humans
This paper focuses on how humans navigate among humans,
yet with the intent to apply gained insights to improve the
navigation of robots among humans. It needs to be inves-
tigated if the results of this work can be directly applied
to the robot navigation problem in populated environments
since humans may react differently towards a robot than
towards a human. Nevertheless, existing literature indicates
that humans perceive and treat robots similar as humans to
some extent. Accordingly, humans already associate human
features with inanimate devices. For example, they attribute
emotions with robot motion patterns [69] and ascribe inten-
tions to moving objects, even if they are merely geometric
shapes [14,26,33]. Intriguingly, researches also exposed that
a robot action is represented in a similar manner within the
human brain as the respective human action, if only for
hand gestures and humanoid grippers [84]. But even if a
robot resembles a human only to some degree, human-like
behaviors or features are still advantageous. Thus, theMedia
Equation Theory [64] and the associated research field of
social robotics show that the performance of human-robot
collaboration is enhanced when robots employ human-like
behaviors [12,20,35,45,77]. Thus, we are confident that our
conclusions can enhance the human-robot cooperation dur-
ing navigation.
7 Conclusion
Theunderstanding and correctmodeling of interaction-aware
decision making of humans during navigation is crucial to
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further evolve robotic systems that operate in human pop-
ulated workspaces. This paper introduces non-cooperative
game theory and the Nash equilibrium as a framework to
model the decision process behind human interaction-aware
behavior. A condition for the suitability of Nash’s theory
is that humans behave rationally in a sense that they aim
to minimize their own cost. In this work, this assumption
was implicitly validated for five different cost functions. The
game theoretic approach was first proposed formally and
was then applied and validated for the problem of predict-
ing the decision of multiple agents passing each other. We
showed that the solution concept of Nash equilibria in games
picks trajectories that are similar to the humans’ choice of
trajectories. Thereby, the best results were achieved with a
static game model in combination with a length based cost
function. Moreover, using elemental cost functions—based
solely on the length of the trajectory or the time needed—
tended to bemore accurate than the respective learning based
cost functions. The game theoretic approach was addition-
ally compared with a prediction based decision model. It
anticipates collisions but omits the reasoning about possible
other motions of persons, i.e. the interaction-awareness. The
results show that both presented game theoretic models out-
perform the prediction based decision model. This further
highlights the need to include interaction-awareness into the
decision modeling.
The derived knowledge is helpful for a variety of robotic
systems, like future service robots that need to predict human
motion more accurately or that need to move in a human-like
way. It is equally usable for the autonomous automobile nav-
igation or for modeling the interaction during armmovement
coordination tasks.
Future work includes improving the results by using a
cost function that considers further interaction parameters
like social or traffic rules. Thus, other solution concepts
(Pareto optimality, fairness equilibrium) can be validated and
compared to the Nash equilibrium. Additionally, one has to
analyze if humans converge mainly to a specific equilibrium.
Coordination games would supply a promising framework
for this analysis. In order to consider uncertainties in the
game formulation (e.g., the cost function of the players or
their goals) we plan to apply Bayesian games and run exper-
iments in which the players do have imperfect information
about the intentions of the other players.Moreover, we intend
to implement a game theory basedmotion planner and to con-
duct human-human/human-robot experiments. They further
evaluate the future approach and the question on howhumans
perceive robots during navigation.
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